Putin's new nuclear doctrine: It's my arsenal and I'll strike if I want to

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Russia’s new nuclear doctrine on Nov. 19, just days after US President Joe Biden’s decision to allow Ukraine to strike Russian territory with US-made weapons. The timing of its publication surely is intended to send a message of displeasure to the West about this decision — as well as a larger anger around Western support for Ukraine in general. It also comes in the context of talks among the P5 — the nuclear weapon states defined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: the US, UK, France, Russia, and China — that were scheduled earlier to discuss nuclear doctrine, but delayed by Russia and now back on the calendar.

However, the contents of the document should not shock those paying attention. In truth, the changes contained in the doctrine are consistent with longer-term shifts in Russian public messaging about its nuclear deterrent, practical changes in Russia’s threat environment, as well as its own capabilities and confidence in those capabilities. In fact, the 2024 doctrine is likely closer to Russia’s actual nuclear doctrine, which is that Russia will use nuclear weapons whenever Putin thinks it necessary to do so.

Public-facing, unclassified nuclear doctrine documents are a product of the post-Cold War thaw in relations, with the US publishing its first Nuclear Posture Review in 1994. Russia’s military was in a state of collapse at the time, with concern in Moscow that the United States might intervene in Russia’s bloody Chechen wars or in Iraq (twice) and Yugoslavia, or worse, overthrow the regime in Moscow.

While Russia did not release an unclassified version of its nuclear doctrine during the 1990s, its leadership engaged in very public nuclear messaging, culminating with simulated nuclear strikes against NATO at the end of its ZAPAD 1999 exercise and a public discussion on a very-low Russian nuclear threshold. However, Russia’s nuclear threats were increasingly at odds with its position in the United Nations — particularly in the dialogue around the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty — which has led to confusion about what, exactly, their doctrine allowed or precluded in terms of actual nuclear use.

Finally, in 2020, Russia released its first public nuclear doctrine document, which appeared to have a very high threshold for nuclear use — with nuclear weapons used “exclusively as a means of deterrence, their use being an extreme and compelled measure.” There are mentions of nuclear weapons in other official documents — such as Russia’s official Military Doctrine (current version: 2014), but they have a similarly high threshold. Such a high perceived threshold for nuclear use is not consistent with Russia’s nuclear posture — which includes nuclear weapons designed for warfighting — and became a direct impediment in President Vladimir Putin’s threats against the US and NATO for their support of Ukraine.

Thus, something had to change. Russia’s new Nuclear Doctrine was published on the Kremlin website as Decree 991, “On the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence,” replacing the previous version — Decree 355 of 2 June 2020. As with all things, the devil is in the details. And, because bureaucrats are bureaucrats (that is, naturally lazy), a side-by-side comparison of the 2020 and 2024 documents is the best way to highlight and analyze the changes.

So, what’s different? Structurally, it’s almost identical, with a few minor deletions alongside some highly-significant new language intended to make Russian threats more credible against its adversaries — particularly NATO and the United States. It is still about six pages, with 26 paragraphs (versus 25 in the old one) and a number of sub paragraphs, organized around four sections:

General Provisions (one very important change) The Essence of Nuclear Deterrence (some significant changes) Conditions for the Transition of the Russian Federation to the Use of Nuclear Weapons (very significant changes) and Tasks and Functions of Federal State Authorities, Other State Bodies and Organizations in the Implementation of State Policy in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence (no significant changes)

Informed from 1,000 days of conflict in Ukraine and the world’s response, Russia’s new doctrine first and foremost seeks to lower the threshold for nuclear weapons use. The new doctrine accomplishes this by removing the word “exclusively” for the use of nuclear weapons (new doctrine paragraph 6: “The Russian Federation considers nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence, the use of which is an extreme and necessary measure”). It also replaces the threshold for use against actions that threaten the existence or viability of the state to include actions that pose a critical threat to Russian or Belarusian sovereignty or territorial integrity (new doctrine paragraphs 18 and 19.d, 2020 doctrine paragraph 17) including conventional attacks — a far more subjective judgement, leaving open nuclear use in far more abstract threat scenarios.

Then, in Sections 2 and 3, Russia’s new doctrine expands who it is seeking to deter with nuclear weapons, under what conditions it would use nuclear weapons, and who it is defending under its nuclear umbrella.

Section 2 expands the “who it is seeking to deter” by adding not just nuclear weapon states (e.g., the US) or states in military blocs (new paragraph 10 in the 2024 doctrine) allied with nuclear weapon states (i.e., NATO) to include states that enable attacks on Russian territory from their borders and states that have significant conventional capabilities allied with nuclear weapon states (paragraph 11) or not allied with a nuclear weapon state (paragraph 9).

In plainer terms, this now gives Russia the doctrine that any nation aligned with a nuclear state, or any state receiving assistance from any nuclear state or state aligned with a nuclear state — i.e., all of NATO — can be the target of nuclear weapons if Russia feels threatened.

Section 3 expands the part about “what conditions it would use nuclear weapons” significantly, to include not only launch on warning of ballistic missile attack (old doctrine paragraph 19 a), but a new formulation aimed towards a more comprehensive program of Launch on Warning: “receipt of reliable information on the massive launch (take-off) of aerospace attack weapons (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aircraft) and their crossing of the state border of the Russian Federation” (new paragraph 19 e).

Further on conditions for nuclear use, Russia’s nuclear doctrine lists dangers that might become threats that would require nuclear use. The old and the new doctrine both list the possession of WMD by adversaries, expansion of and deployment of missile defenses, buildups of conventional forces, nuclear weapons in outer space, nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of non-nuclear weapon states, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (the old doctrine highlighted the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons only, the new doctrine expands this to all WMD).

But the new doctrine adds new or expanded blocs of countries allied against Russia with military infrastructure nearby (15.f), the threat of blockades of Russia (15.g), the threat of damaging facilities that could cause widespread environmental damage (15.h) and the planning or conduct of exercises near Russia’s borders (15.i).

I guess Russia will try to deter what it does best?

Finally, Section 3 expands “who it is defending”  with nuclear deterrence to include not just Russia and its allies (as in the 2020 doctrine), but specifically Belarus, and Belarus as part of the Union State (additions to paragraphs 18 and 19d), and to use nuclear deterrence Russian military forces outside its territory (new paragraph 19.b).

The remaining changes are consistent with recent developments, including central control by Russia of its nuclear forces based abroad (read: Belarus), and it eliminates any reference to compliance with arms control — a bad sign for the future of New START, scheduled to end Feb. 4, 2026.

In all, the new doctrine says that Russia will use nuclear weapons whenever the president decides to do so. It also contains a laundry list of things it doesn’t like, in an effort to try to shape Western behavior. But by expanding the role of nuclear weapons beyond “exclusively” deterrence, and by expanding the dangers that could become threats — to include military infrastructure or exercises near its borders — it risks sending ambiguous or non-credible deterrent signals that could, in turn, require Putin to act out further in order to credibly deter the West.

It remains to be seen if President-elect Donald Trump will seek to stabilize the relationship with Russia, seek new arms control arrangements with Russia and China, acquiesce to Russian demands over things like Ukraine or NATO, or move in other unexpected directions.

Regardless, in the interim, we can expect more threats from Moscow on the basis of a doctrinal document that is interesting but remains firmly in the world of propaganda rather than military doctrine.

William Alberque is the former Director of NATO’s Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Center, with a 30-year career spanning the US Department of Defense, State Department, and Department of Energy. He is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center focusing on nuclear weapons and the future of deterrence, risk reduction, conflict management, and arms control.